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WATER AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
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Matthew J. McKissick* 
INTRODUCTION 
“When the well’s dry, we know the worth of water.”1 
Water is life.2 Its unique chemical properties make it indispensable to all 
living organisms on Earth.3 Water is a fundamental human need and should 
therefore be a fundamental human right.4 Simply put, an adequate supply of 
clean water is essential for a properly functioning democracy, making it “im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . .”5 
                                                        
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2019, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Neva-
da, Las Vegas. First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Gillian Griffith, for her 
support and encouragement—without her, my legal education and this note would not have 
been possible. I would also like to pay special tribute to my father-in-law, Thomas Jingoli, 
for his guidance and helping bring my dream of obtaining a law degree to fruition. I want to 
thank my mom, Maureen McKissick, for teaching me the importance of relying on sound 
reason and research, and lastly, I want to thank my mentor and friend, Matthew Setty, for 
showing me the world through the eyes of an environmental scientist. Thank you.  
1  Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 
1265 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 1746 
(1914)). 
2  As a former hydrologist, I spent my career surveying, monitoring, and enhancing water 
resources throughout the U.S. and abroad. I was dedicated to understanding the physical and 
chemical properties of water, as well as the institutions that manage it. After witnessing se-
vere environmental injustice resulting from mismanagement and regulatory failure, I devel-
oped a deep appreciation for the laws that protect society from these abuses. Looking back 
on my experiences through a legal lens has caused me to reconsider whether the law should 
recognize access to clean water as a fundamental human right. 
3  See PHILIP BALL, LIFE’S MATRIX: A BIOGRAPHY OF WATER 222 (2000) (stating “[w]ithout 
water, life simply cannot be sustained”); Tia Ghose, Why is Water so Essential for Life?, 
LIVE SCI. (Sept. 29, 2015, 11:38 AM), https://www.livescience.com/52332-why-is-water-nee 
ded-for-life.html [https://perma.cc/H5KX-4AT4]. 
4  LINDSAY KNIGHT, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER 6 (2003) (referring to 
quote made by Kofi Annan, the United Nations Security-General). 
5   See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
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Where water is depleted, conflict inevitably ensues.6 Given its undeniable 
importance, this result is not surprising. Water conflicts occur all over the 
world, particularly in developing nations, resulting in protests, warfare, and 
death.7 The U.S. is no exception to this harsh reality and, in fact, has experi-
enced its own share of water wars. The California Water Wars during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, for example, resulted in farmers and 
ranchers in Northern California’s Owens Valley attacking the Los Angeles Aq-
ueduct.8 
Those who rely on non-municipal water supplies view the economic forces 
on water—such as water privatization and rural-to-urban water transfers—as a 
direct threat to their livelihood.9 Large-scale water infrastructure projects are 
consistently contentious for this reason. As some cities continue to expand, re-
quiring more and more water, others (i.e., nearby rural communities) must for-
go their water in order to meet the growing urban demand.10 
Rural communities have grappled with this dilemma for decades, and un-
fortunately it may never cease. This rural-versus-urban scenario was precisely 
what sparked the California Water Wars,11 and in fact, a contemporary example 
of this dispute is currently taking place between the Southern Nevada Water 
Authority (SNWA) and the agricultural communities throughout central-eastern 
Nevada.12 In order to meet the growing water needs of Las Vegas, SNWA is 
proposing a pipeline project to convey groundwater from the aquifers near Ely 
to its Las Vegas facilities;13 however, the project has been the subject of several 
lawsuits14 and continues to be stalled in the courts.15 
                                                        
6  For an interesting analysis of this fact using contemporary cartographic techniques, see 
Greg Miller, Maps Show How Water Can Be a Precious Lifeline–or a Deadly Weapon, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 8, 2017), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/08/maps-atla 
s-water-conflict-syria-isis/ [https://perma.cc/V7UD-EG29] (discussing how depleting an area 
of water is a war tactic used by terrorist groups). 
7  William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER (Apr. 8, 2002), https://www.newyorker 
.com/magazine/2002/04/08/leasing-the-rain [https://perma.cc/TK6C-GEAQ] (documenting 
the Chochabamba Water War in Bolivia). 
8  DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GOES: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE COLORADO RIVER 
124–25 (2017). 
9  See Emily Green, Not This Water, LAS VEGAS SUN (June 22, 2008, 2:00 AM), https://lasve 
gassun.com/news/2008/jun/22/not-water/ [https://perma.cc/JY2K-KTYS]. 
10  See OWEN, supra note 8, at 124–25. 
11  Id. 
12  Henry Brean, Ranchers Criticize Southern Nevada Water Agency’s Pipeline Plan, LAS 
VEGAS REV. J. (Sept. 29, 2017, 5:29 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-
government/ranchers-criticize-southern-nevada-water-agencys-pipeline-plan/ 
[https://perma.cc/YJ9C-BTRD]. 
13  S. NEV. WATER AUTH., WATER RESOURCE PLAN 2017, 2, 50 (2017), https://www.snwa.co 
m/assets/pdf/water-resource-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PZ8-4E5T]. 
14  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 2:14–CV–00226–APG–
VCF, 2017 WL 3667700, at *1 (D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (order granting in part and denying 
in part parties’ motion for summary judgment). 
19 NEV. L.J. 341, MCKISSICK 1/28/2019  11:45 AM 
Fall 2018] THE WELL’S RUN DRY 343 
 
As people continue to relocate from rural areas to urban cities (usually for 
economic reasons) water must be available for those cities to flourish. The abil-
ity to travel means nothing unless the water necessary for travelers to survive at 
their new destination is accessible. To complicate matters further, climate 
change poses a serious threat to the sustainability of many water supplies as the 
ability to replenish those systems becomes less reliable.16 Thus, in order to 
avoid conflict and environmental injustice, the law must recognize access to 
safe, clean water as a fundamental constitutional right. This proposition is sup-
ported not only by notions of equity, but also by longstanding principles of wa-
ter law that recognize the central role of water in every community and the 
government’s historical obligation to properly manage this vital resource. 
This article analyzes American water law—particularly as it has developed 
in the Southwest—and considers the right to water as a fundamental right 
through the lens of these water law doctrines. Through case law and policy 
considerations, this article explores the principles of federally reserved water 
rights and the public trust, two doctrines that acknowledge water as being both 
implicitly essential to society and historically recognized as a vital public re-
source. Ultimately, this article proposes that legal practitioners embrace an in-
terdisciplinary approach to establish water as a fundamental right. That is, ra-
ther than relying solely on constitutional doctrines to determine if a new right is 
worthy of being deemed fundamental, the law should turn to doctrines that are 
inherently rooted in the underlying subject matter of the perceived right. By us-
ing an interdisciplinary approach, one finds that many of the questions raised in 
the constitutional analysis have already been answered by other doctrines. 
Part I will outline the Supreme Court’s process for determining whether a 
fundamental right exists and provides a brief overview of the constitutional 
analysis. Parts II and III will then describe two specific water law doctrines—
federally reserved water rights and the public trust—which provide answers 
and insight to the constitutional analysis. 
I. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO WATER 
As the Supreme Court has made clear, some individual liberties are so im-
portant that they are deemed fundamental rights. And the government cannot 
violate fundamental rights unless state action is necessary to fulfill a compel-
ling governmental interest.17 In other words, the government must adopt the 
least restrictive means to fulfill its compelling interest—strict scrutiny—if its 
                                                                                                                                
15  Henry Brean, Ruling on Southern Nevada Water Agency’s Pipeline Project Months Away, 
LAS VEGAS REV. J. (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-
and-government/ruling-on-southern-nevada-water-agencys-pipeline-project-months-away/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CPM-HALP]. 
16  See Aris Georgakakos et al., Chapter 3: Water Resources, in CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES: U.S. NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 69–76 (2014). 
17  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 954 (5th ed. 2017). 
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actions infringe a fundamental right.18 Generally, this means the government 
loses.19 Only governmental interests that are truly compelling enough to super-
sede fundamental rights (i.e., national security20) are capable of satisfying this 
stringent standard of judicial review. 
In many ways, fundamental rights are the cornerstone of American justice. 
They not only provide the legal foundation by which citizens may challenge the 
actions of their government, they also represent the values that we as a society 
deem most important. Put another way, fundamental rights define who we are. 
They represent our most core values, making them worthy of the highest level 
of legal protection. 
As Americans, we cherish our fundamental rights, holding them out to the 
world as symbols of our country’s identity. The right to travel,21 the right to 
marry,22 and the right to an equal vote23 are all examples of individual liberty 
interests we protect as fundamental rights. However, these fundamental rights 
were not always recognized by American jurisprudence—or at least not in the 
same way they are today.24 The Supreme Court recognizes new fundamental 
rights to reflect society’s evolving stance on the issues associated with those 
rights.25 In the same manner that we now look back upon slavery as being ir-
reconcilable with our modern understanding of fundamental rights, perhaps one 
day we will look back upon the government’s refusal to afford its people with a 
basic right to water with similar disdain. 
                                                        
18  Id. 
19  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining 
that strict scrutiny implies “near-automatic condemnation”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 
191, 211 (1992) (explaining that “it is the rare case in which we have held that a law sur-
vives strict scrutiny”). 
20  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that “all legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That 
is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional . . . . Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions”), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. 
Ct. 2392 (2018). 
21  Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999). 
22  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
23  Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
24  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (explaining that “[t]he ancient 
origins of marriage confirm its centrality, but it has not stood in isolation from developments 
in law and society. The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. That insti-
tution—even as confined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time.”) (emphasis add-
ed). 
25  See id. at 2608 (holding “the Court also must hold—and it now does hold—that there is 
no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage . . . on the 
ground of its same-sex character”). 
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A. The Constitutional Analysis of Implied Fundamental Rights 
Rights not explicitly stated in the Constitution must be inferred from its 
text.26 These are the so-called implied fundamental rights, and their creation 
remains as contentious today as it was when they were first recognized.27 Some 
find the very practice of inferring fundamental rights as being repugnant to 
what the Constitution stands for.28 To them, the federal government is purely 
one of enumerated powers, and therefore, the Supreme Court simply lacks the 
authority to recognize a right that is not directly described in the Constitution.29 
However, the Constitution itself recognizes rights not explicitly described in its 
text when, for example, it explains those rights not enumerated are “retained by 
the people.”30 Thus, it is clear the Constitution does in fact encompass rights 
not explicitly stated therein—but how and where do we find them? 
To answer this, the Supreme Court relies on the Constitution’s Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, which guarantee that no person shall be deprived of 
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”31 The rights conferred to 
individuals through these clauses are premised on due process, resulting in a 
substantive due process right.32 Due process not only prescribes the procedures 
the government must follow,33 it is also the basis of the underlying rights that 
the government must recognize as well. Since its inception in the 1930s, sub-
stantive due process remains an elusive and controversial legal theory.34 How-
ever, this controversy has not stopped the Supreme Court from finding several 
rights that fall within the scope of liberty protected by the Constitution. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the liberty interest protected 
by the Constitution encompasses the right of privacy,35 which consequently in-
cludes the right to have access to an abortion36 and receive contraceptives.37 
                                                        
26  See CHEMERINKSY, supra note 17, at 951 (describing how “the Ninth Amendment is used 
to provide a textual justification for the Court to protect nontextual rights”). 
27  See id. at 952–53 (discussing the “constitutional interpretation debate” and the various 
approaches to finding fundamental rights). 
28  See id. (explaining that “originalists take the position that fundamental rights are limited 
to those liberties explicitly stated in the [Constitution’s] text or clearly intended by the fram-
ers”). 
29  See id. 
30  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
31  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
32  CHEMERINKSY, supra note 17, at 951 (explaining that the term “liberty” in the Due Pro-
cess Clause has been interpreted as granting parents with the fundamental right to maintain 
custody of their children). 
33  Id. (discussing how procedural due process requires the government to provide notice and 
a hearing before terminating a parent’s custody rights). 
34  Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999) (ex-
plaining that “[t]here is no concept in American law that is more elusive or more controver-
sial than substantive due process”). 
35  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (explaining that “the right of privacy 
. . . is a legitimate one”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (discussing that “the Court 
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The lack of a defined methodology for determining which rights fall within 
the scope of substantive due process—thus becoming fundamental through the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments—is one of the primary reasons for the con-
troversy surrounding its application. To this day, legal scholars debate what the 
proper inquiry should be when determining what rights are fundamental.38 
Originalists contend that the Court improperly usurps the democratic process 
when it declares rights are fundamental without any legislative foundation.39 
Nonoriginalists (functionalists), on the other hand, counter that the Supreme 
Court may protect fundamental rights not enumerated in the Constitution.40 
Some argue the Court should only recognize rights that are essential to the op-
eration of the political process,41 while others maintain that the Court should 
rely only on natural law principles in determining fundamental rights.42 
To a certain extent, the Supreme Court takes most of these aspects into 
consideration when it engages in the process of finding fundamental rights. The 
landmark opinions where a new fundamental right is established generally ded-
icate a considerable amount of text to describing the Court’s changing view of 
the right at issue.43 Typically, these cases are extremely fact-specific, relying on 
the nuances of how the story unfolds—so much so that some creative litigants 
have gone to extreme lengths to ensure the narrative of a case clearly demon-
strates a violation of a perceived fundamental right.44 
Generally, rights that by their very nature implicate the ability of the hu-
man race to sustain itself are viewed as fundamental, and consequently worthy 
of constitutional protection.45 For example, in explaining how marriage quali-
fies as a fundamental right, the Supreme Court in Loving described the right as 
being “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”46 Language like this 
suggests that access to safe water should easily qualify as a fundamental right, 
                                                                                                                                
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of 
privacy, does exist under the Constitution”). 
36  Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
37  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485, 499. 
38  CHEMERINKSY, supra note 17, at 952. 
39  Id. at 952–53. 
40  Id. at 953. 
41  Id. (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)). 
42  Id. (citing HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1994)). 
43  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595–96 (2015) (describing how the right to 
marry was traditionally viewed as being between a man and a woman but noting how that 
concept has evolved over time). 
44  See David Oshinsky, Strange Justice: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas, by Dale Carpen-
ter, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/books/review/the-story-of-l 
awrence-v-texas-by-dale-carpenter.html [https://perma.cc/JR42-NM5G] (describing DALE 
CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT (2012)). 
45  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (explaining that “[m]arriage is . . . fundamental 
to our very existence and survival”). 
46  Id. 
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as obviously no one can survive without it. However, the Court’s approach to 
finding fundamental rights throughout the second half of the twentieth century 
was widely criticized as being too subjective,47 leading the Court to formulate a 
new fundamental rights analysis capable of being both objective and consistent. 
Today, the Supreme Court usually addresses at least two important ques-
tions when considering a new fundamental right: (1) is the right or activity im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty,48 and (2) is the right or activity “deeply 
rooted in [the Nation’s] history and traditions”?49 This two-pronged analysis 
represents somewhat of a compromise between the originalist and functionalist 
perspectives. It asks the Court to recognize a right that society is likely to be-
lieve is simply a part of our American way of life (the functionalist view), 
while also requiring that right be historically recognized in accordance with the 
Founders’ intentions (the originalist view). How the right is defined is another 
important consideration. That is, the Supreme Court requires a “careful descrip-
tion” of the asserted fundamental right.50 
For the purposes of this article, we may define the right as the individual’s 
right to an adequate supply of safe, potable water necessary for human survival. 
Any discussion on whether this definition satisfies the Court’s requisite level of 
clarity would be purely speculative, and therefore the remainder of this article 
will focus on the two-pronged constitutional analysis. To answer these ques-
tions, this article relies on the principles already established by two longstand-
ing water law doctrines: the federally reserved water rights doctrine and the 
public trust doctrine. Before embarking on this analysis, however, it is worth 
discussing the fact that states have already begun to address this fundamental 
right on their own, which provides further support for the article’s ultimate 
proposition. 
B. California’s Historic Step 
In 2013, California became the first state to explicitly make access to clean 
water a fundamental right.51 Commonly referred to as the Human Right to Wa-
ter Bill, California Assembly Bill 685 provides that “every human being” has 
“the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for human 
                                                        
47  See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 445 
(1984). 
48  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997) (discussing how those rights that 
are “so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty . . . are protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
49  Id. at 703 (explaining that “the Court has regularly observed that the [Due Process] 
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deep-
ly rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”). 
50  Id. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)) (explaining, for example, the dif-
ference in describing the right to doctor-assisted euthanasia as the “right to die” or the right 
to “determin[e] the time and manner of one’s death”). 
51  See CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3 (West 2018). 
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consumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes.”52 The Bill was meant to not on-
ly express the public policy goal of universally making access to water a human 
right, but also to create an administrative duty for agencies involved in water 
allocation to consider this policy when making decisions that impact water 
use.53 
Members of the United Nations praised the passage of California’s Human 
Right to Water Bill.54 Catrina de Albuquerque, a United Nations independent 
expert and Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, declared the Bill an “inspiring example” for the rest of the world and 
congratulated California on its “historic step.”55 In discussing its passage, de 
Albuquerque explained that she couldn’t help but recall the tragedies she wit-
nessed for the farmworkers in the San Joaquin Valley “who were condemned to 
drinking the water from their polluted wells because they did not have the 
money to purchase bottled water.”56 Since climate change is likely to heavily 
affect California in the upcoming decades, the effort “to adopt a comprehensive 
policy on the human right to water” is particularly important for a state with 
such a large population.57 
Opponents of the Human Right to Water Bill feared its enactment would 
lead to higher water bills overall if water agencies were prohibited from shut-
ting off service to customers who defaulted on their bills, thereby forcing pay-
ing customers to subsidize the customers who cannot afford to pay.58 They also 
pointed out the dangerous ambiguity in the term “affordable,” which they 
claimed was likely to lead to ongoing litigation.59 
Despite these concerns, California courts have seen almost no lawsuits 
based on the Human Right to Water Bill—only one case uses the policy set 
forth by the Bill to support arguments that rely on other statutory provisions.60 
                                                        
52  Id. (“(a) It is hereby declared to be the established policy of the state that every human 
being has the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for human con-
sumption, cooking, and sanitary purposes. (b) All relevant state agencies, including the de-
partment, the state board, and the State Department of Public Health, shall consider this state 
policy when revising, adopting, or establishing policies, regulations, and grant criteria when 
those policies, regulations, and criteria are pertinent to the uses of water described in this 
section.”). 
53  Skylar Marshall, California Declares a Human Right to Water, U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 
BLOG (June 10, 2013), http://duwaterlawreview.com/ca-human-right-to-water/ [https://perma 
.cc/UW82-N5YP]. 
54  California Law on Human Right to Water Sets Example for Others – UN Expert, UN 
NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/09/421852 [https://perma.cc/2LSZ 
-FUJD]. 
55  Id. (quoting Catarina de Albuquerque). 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Marshall, supra note 53. 
59  Id. 
60  Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 13, Zamora 
v. Cent. Coast Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., No. 15CV-0247, 2015 WL 2359800 (Cal. 
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Additionally, the Bill places no affirmative obligation on water agencies to 
provide water,61 and thus its opponents’ fear that the Bill would result in the 
overnight subsidization of low-income communities never came to fruition. 
II. THE FEDERALLY RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
The doctrine of federally reserved water rights stands for the proposition 
that when the federal government reserves land, it also implicitly reserves a 
supply of water necessary to satisfy the purpose of the reservation.62 Reserva-
tions have been enacted through both presidential executive orders and acts of 
Congress.63 Generally, the priority date of this implicit water right is the date 
the reservation was established.64 
The Supreme Court first developed this doctrine in 1908 in Winters v. 
United States.65 The Court held that the creation of the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation implicitly reserved water for future use in the amount necessary to 
fulfill the purpose of that tribal reservation, which included uses such as irrigat-
ing crops, bathing, and consumption.66 The Court granted the Tribe a priority 
date corresponding to the treaty date used to establish the reservation.67 As a 
result of this decision, this doctrine is now commonly referred to as the Winters 
doctrine, and the rights created under it as Winters rights.68 
Winters was a landmark case. It was this decision that marked the recogni-
tion that when the federal government holds natural resources on behalf of a 
community, it must provide enough water for that community to be sustaina-
ble.69 In other words, access to water is implicit in the concept of civilization 
itself. 
                                                                                                                                
Super. Ct. May 8, 2015). At this time this article was written, Zamora was the only case to 
cite the California Water Code provision making water a fundamental right within the 
Westlaw database. 
61  CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(c) (West 2018) (“This section does not expand any obligation 
of the state to provide water or to require the expenditure of additional resources to develop 
water infrastructure beyond the obligations that may exist pursuant to subdivision (b).”). 
62  BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 1025 (5th ed. 
2013). 
63  See id. at 1022–23; Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water 
Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “[t]he bulk of the Agua Caliente 
Reservation was formally established by two Presidential Executive Orders”). 
64  See THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 62, at 1023. 
65  See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). 
66  Id. at 576–76. 
67  Id. at 575, 577 (holding that the case turned on the agreement of May 1888). 
68  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1268 (introducing “what has become known as the Winters 
doctrine”). 
69  Winters, 207 U.S. at 577 (holding that the government reserved enough water that would 
be “necessarily continued through years” so that the tribe could “continu[e] their old hab-
its”). 
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By the 1960s, the Supreme Court extended the Winters doctrine to national 
forests70 and monuments,71 finding the doctrine’s rationale equally applicable 
to other governmental purposes. Today, Winters’ rights can be asserted on most 
lands managed by the federal government, and the doctrine continues to expand 
to accommodate new circumstances and water sources. 
A. Expanding the Doctrine: the Agua Caliente Decision 
March 7, 2017, marked the next step in the long evolution of the Winters 
doctrine.72 In Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Wa-
ter District, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended Winters 
rights to groundwater for the first time in American history.73 Prior to this deci-
sion, Winters rights were only applied to surface waters.74 To understand how 
Winters rights are applied today, it is helpful to understand the events that lead 
to the Agua Caliente decision and the policy considerations that guided the 
Court’s analysis. 
The Agua Caliente case, in an unusual procedural posture, has been trifur-
cated.75 At the time this article was written, the final holdings of the case were 
yet to be determined. The 2017 opinion marked the first of this three-step pro-
cess.76 First, the court had to determine whether the Tribe had a reserved right 
to groundwater at all, which required extending their Winters rights to a water 
source it had never been applied to.77 Having answered that question in the af-
firmative, the next two steps of the case will determine: (1) whether the Tribe 
beneficially owns the “pore space” of the groundwater aquifer underlying the 
reservation and whether the right includes the right to receive water of a certain 
quality, and (2), what quantity of groundwater the right secures.78 Before we 
discuss these topics, one must first understand the origin of the Aqua Caliente 
Tribe and the historical context in which their rights developed. 
B. History of the Agua Caliente Tribe 
The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians have resided near present-day 
Palm Springs for over 5,000 years.79 Originally, the Cahuilla Indians named the 
                                                        
70  United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718 (1978). 
71  Cappaert v. United States., 426 U.S. 128, 139–41 (1976). 
72  See Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1262, 1271. 
73  Id. at 1271 (holding “[w]e can discern no reason to cabin the Winters doctrine to appurte-
nant surface water. As such, we hold that the Winters doctrine encompasses both surface wa-
ter and groundwater”). 
74  See id. 
75  Id. at 1267. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Cultural History, AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS http://www.aguacaliente. 
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Palm Springs area Sec-he, meaning “boiling water,” in reference to the life-
giving force of the mineral hot spring that now bears the name of the Tribe.80 
The Agua Caliente Mineral Hot Spring provided the Tribe with a source of 
clean water, which they used for consumption and bathing, and a spiritual con-
nection point.81 The Hot Spring was used for healing purposes, and the Tribe 
relied on it for numerous ceremonies, marking nearly every important mile-
stone in life.82 
Like most early tribal reservations, the Agua Caliente Reservation was 
formally established by Presidential Executive Order. On May 15, 1876, Presi-
dent Ulysses S. Grant declared that the land that would become the Agua Ca-
liente Reservation was “withdrawn from sale and set apart as reservations for 
the permanent use and occupancy of the Mission Indians in [S]outhern Califor-
nia.”83 The following year, President Rutherford B. Hayes signed another Ex-
ecutive Order which set aside additional lands for “Indian purposes.”84 Togeth-
er, these Executive Orders created the bulk of the Agua Caliente Reservation, 
which consists of approximately 31,396 acres throughout Southern California.85 
As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted, the Executive Orders 
were “short in length, but broad in purpose.”86 Executive Orders such as these 
were the result of a national agenda to assimilate Native American communi-
ties into American life.87 Detailed government reports identified the urgent 
need to reserve land for Native American use to encourage tribes to “build 
comfortable houses, improve their acres, and surround themselves with home 
comforts.”88 These reports highlighted settlers’ concerns that conflict amongst 
American settlers and Native Americans would never end until Native Ameri-
cans were granted land for their own exclusive use and enjoyment.89 In the end, 
                                                                                                                                
org/content/History%20and%20Culture/ [https://perma.cc/7993-DK9E] (last visited Oct. 5, 
2018). 
80  See id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1265. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  See generally id. 
88  Id. (citing COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF., ANN. REP. 224 (1875)). 
89  COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFF., ANN. REP. 224 (1875) (“If white settlers are permitted to 
remain on these lands set apart for Indian occupation, I cannot see that anything whatever 
[would] be gained in the settlement of these difficulties. If these pre-emptions are allowed to 
go on, most surely all these conflicts and difficulties will go on. What these people want, and 
what they ought to have, is just enough tillable land for their gardens and range for their 
stock. The Government should own and hold the lands, protecting them in all their rights of 
exclusive possession, [as] long as they occupy.” Recommendation of D.A. Dryden, United 
States Special Agent). 
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the United States sought to protect both Americans and tribal members by “se-
cur[ing] the Mission Indians permanent homes, with land and water enough.”90 
C. Applying Winters to the Agua Caliente Tribe 
The purpose behind the creation of the Agua Caliente Tribe’s reservation is 
critical to understand how the Winters doctrine applies. For well over a century, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that when the United States “withdraws its 
land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Govern-
ment, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the ex-
tent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”91 The federal gov-
ernment’s implicitly reserved water rights are directly applicable “to Indian 
reservations . . . encompassing water rights[.]”92 
The Winters doctrine rests on the notion that the federal government, when 
negotiating with Native American tribes to create reservations, “intended to 
deal fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters without which 
their lands would have been useless.”93 Winters’ rights are premised on the fact 
that life, particularly in the West, simply cannot exist without water.94 As the 
Agua Caliente court noted, in an area such as Palm Springs, “survival is condi-
tioned on access to water.”95 
Under the Winters doctrine, the Agua Caliente Tribe’s implicit right is lim-
ited to the amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of their reserva-
tion.96 As previously mentioned, the 1876 Executive Order declared the reser-
vation was “for the permanent use and occupancy” of the Agua Caliente 
Tribe,97 and therefore the amount of water the Tribe is entitled to is the amount 
necessary for the Tribe to permanently establish a livelihood upon the reserva-
tion. This analysis is the heart of the Winters doctrine and was the first consid-
eration for the court in Agua Caliente.98 
The Agua Caliente Court held that the United States did in fact intend to 
reserve water for the Tribe.99 Before addressing groundwater, the Court first 
analyzed whether the Agua Caliente Reservation carried with it a reserved right 
                                                        
90  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1265–66 (emphasis added) (citing COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN 
AFF., ANN. REP. 37 (1877)). 
91  Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976) (emphasis added). 
92  Id. 
93  Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). 
94  Id. at 598–99 (describing how “[i]t is impossible to believe that when Congress created 
the great Colorado River Indian Reservation and when the Executive Department of this Na-
tion created the other reservations they were unaware that most of the lands were of the de-
sert kind—hot, scorching sands—and that water from the river would be essential to the life 
of the Indian people and to the animals they hunted and the crops they raised”). 
95  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1271. 
96  Id. at 1268. 
97  Id. at 1265. 
98  Id. at 1268. 
99  Id. 
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to water generally.100 After finding it did, the Court’s next step was to deter-
mine the purposes which must be fulfilled.101 The United States only reserves 
“that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no 
more.”102 “Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, 
. . . the United States [must] acquire water in the same manner as any other 
public or private appropriator.”103 
“Winters itself established that the purpose of the reservation is control-
ling,”104 and Winters provided the Ninth Circuit with an almost identical fact-
pattern for applying its holding to Agua Caliente. As previously mentioned, in 
Winters the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation was created by the federal gov-
ernment “for a permanent home” for the several tribes.105 The Supreme Court 
noted that, without irrigation, the arid tribal land would be “practically value-
less” and a civilized community “could not be established thereon.”106 Since 
the purpose of the reservation was for a “permanent home,” the United States 
reserved water “for a use which would be necessarily continued through 
years.”107 
The permanency of the Folk Belknap Indian Reservation is directly analo-
gous to the permanency intended for the Agua Caliente Reservation, and the 
Court applied it accordingly. “Water is inherently tied to the Tribe’s ability to 
live permanently on the reservation. Without water, the underlying purpose—to 
establish a home and support an agrarian society—would be entirely defeat-
ed.”108 Accordingly, the Court held that the primary purpose of the Agua Ca-
liente Reservation was to create a home for the Tribe, which necessarily impli-
cates the need for water.109 
D. Extending Winters Rights to Groundwater 
After concluding that the United States government envisioned rights en-
compassing water use when it created the Agua Caliente Reservation, the court 
then turned to the issue of whether that right included the use of groundwa-
ter.110 This issue addressed the other limitation of the Winters doctrine—that 
only “appurtenant” water is included in the government’s reservation of land.111 
For the first time, the Ninth Circuit held that “appurtenant” water is not limited 
                                                        
100  Id. 
101  Id. at 1270. 
102  Id. at 1268 (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976)). 
103  Id. at 1268–69 (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978)). 
104  Id. at 1269. 
105  Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908). 
106  Id. at 576. 
107  Id. at 577. 
108  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 1271. 
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to surface water.112 Thus, the United States’ implicitly reserved water right for 
the Agua Caliente Reservation (their Winters right) included groundwater.113 
The court came to this logical conclusion by noting the fact that appurte-
nance includes any water that is attached to the land itself.114 In other words, 
any water that comes into contact with the land, regardless of where that con-
tact takes place, is appurtenant to the reservation. Thus, appurtenance is not 
limited to surface water only.115 Rather, appurtenant water includes all water 
flowing through the subsurface of the reservation as well.116 In Cappaert, the 
Supreme Court contemplated this result when it stated, “the United States can 
protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface 
water or groundwater.”117 If the United States can—and does—protect against 
groundwater diversions, it can logically protect the groundwater itself.118 Thus, 
groundwater may be included as one of the physical assets of the federal reser-
vation. 
The Agua Caliente Court also rested its decision on the fact that many 
communities throughout the West rely solely on groundwater as their only via-
ble water source.119 The Tribe, in the court’s view, was no different, finding 
that “such reliance exists here, as surface water in the Coachella Valley is min-
imal or entirely lacking for most of the year.”120 Survival in such arid regions is 
conditioned on access to water, and therefore “a reservation without an ade-
quate source of surface water must be able to access groundwater.”121 There-
fore, the court held that the creation of the Agua Caliente Reservation included 
an implied right to use water from the Coachella Valley aquifer.122 
In sum, Agua Caliente stands for the proposition that the Winters doctrine 
no longer distinguishes surface water from groundwater.123 Rather, Winters’ 
rights are only limited by the government’s intent in withdrawing the land for a 
public purpose and the location of the water in relation to the reservation.124 
                                                        
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 1271–72. 
114  Id. at 1271. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976)). 
118  Id. 
119  Id. See also In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & 
Source, 989 P.2d 739, 746 (Ariz. 1999) (explaining that “[t]he reservations considered in 
[Winters and Arizona] depended for their water on perennial streams. But some reservations 
lack perennial streams and depend for present or future survival substantially or entirely up-
on pumping of underground water. We find it no more thinkable in the latter circumstance 
than in the former that the United States reserved land for habitation without reserving the 
water necessary to sustain life”). 
120  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1271. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 1271–72. 
123  Id. at 1271. 
124  Id. at 1272. 
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Until Agua Caliente, implicitly reserved rights, like Winters’ rights, were only 
applied to surface water.125 This decision, if followed by other jurisdictions, 
could have far-reaching consequences, particularly in the arid Southwest where 
many groundwater aquifers are already over-appropriated and several Native 
American reservations reside. 
E. Linking the Doctrine to Fundamental Rights 
The doctrine of federally reserved water rights sheds light on the first ques-
tion in the constitutional analysis—is the right to access an adequate supply of 
safe, clean water “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty[?]”126 Using the ra-
tionale of the courts in applying this doctrine, the answer appears to be in the 
affirmative; however, rather than applying it to a tribal reservation, national 
forest, park, or monument, we must apply it to the nation as a whole. 
The Agua Caliente court’s logic—that “[w]ater is inherently tied to the . . . 
ability to live permanently”127—is equally applicable to the nation, since with-
out it our way of life “would be entirely defeated.”128 Water’s inherent role in 
sustaining communities is so undeniable that courts are left with no choice but 
to logically conclude that water is a fundamental part of the community itself—
an inference so strong that it justifies the creation of new implicit rights. In the 
same way that the Agua Caliente Tribe’s survival was premised on access to 
water, so too is our own. Thus, the same logic should apply to all those living 
in the U.S., and we should all be afforded with a similar implied right to water. 
As previously mentioned, the “purpose of the reservation is controlling[,]” 
and in Agua Caliente, the purpose was to establish “a permanent home.”129 This 
emphasis on permanency makes the conclusion that all Americans have an im-
plicit right to water even more compelling. We can assume that the Founders 
did not intend for our democracy to be a temporary venture. If one accepts this 
view, then there is no way to differentiate a permanent tribal reservation from 
the nation itself. They are both permanent sovereigns. The U.S. is the perma-
nent home of its people, and the purpose behind its creation was “to form a 
more perfect Union.”130 Unless the Founders did not intend for our Union to 
last through the ages, one simply cannot avoid the inescapable conclusion that 
people in the U.S. have an implicit right to water for the same reasons that trib-
al members have an implicit right to water—it’s necessary to fulfill the purpose 
behind the creation of the sovereignty. 
No human being—Native American, European, or otherwise—can survive 
without water. This fact is so obvious, so incontrovertible that, in general, 
                                                        
125  See id. at 1270–71. 
126  Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
127  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. at 1269 (quoting United States v. Winters, 207 U.S 564, 565 (1908)). 
130  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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courts are forced to rule in favor of tribal communities when applying the doc-
trine of federally reserved water rights. Returning to the constitutional analysis, 
is the right to water implicit in the concept of ordered liberty? The doctrine of 
federally reserved water rights answers this question with a resounding “yes”—
if you live in a tribal sovereignty. Under this article’s interdisciplinary ap-
proach, the first constitutional question has already been answered. 
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
The public trust doctrine stands for the principle that the government holds 
all the natural resources under its control—including water—under special trust 
obligations for the benefit of the public.131 The government, as trustee, has a 
duty to manage the trust in a manner that is in the public’s best interest.132 
Where the doctrine of federally reserved water rights recognizes water’s im-
portance in sustaining communities, the public trust doctrine recognizes the 
public’s inherent interest in water generally. 
Rooted in Roman law, the public trust doctrine was originally articulated 
by Emperor Justinian when he proclaimed, “[T]he following things are by natu-
ral law common all—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the sea-
shore. No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore . . . .”133 From its 
earliest iteration, the doctrine emphasizes the importance of humanity’s shared 
essential resources, and therefore special treatment of these resources is war-
ranted to ensure they are not degraded or controlled entirely by private inter-
ests. Applying this logic, many states, including Nevada, have incorporated this 
idea into their statutory framework by enacting legislation that explicitly makes 
water a public resource.134 Consequently, water resources cannot be privatized 
in the same manner as other real property. 
Once integrated into Anglo-American jurisprudence, courts generally lim-
ited the application of the public trust doctrine to situations involving com-
merce, navigation, and fishing.135 The judiciary viewed these circumstances as 
invoking the strongest public interest considerations, and they were fixed to ar-
                                                        
131  See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475, 478 (1970). Professor Sax’s article is often re-
garded as the seminal document that first identified the public trust doctrine as being the ap-
propriate legal foundation for the newly emerging field of environmental law. See Gerald 
Torres & Nathan Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & 
POL’Y 281, 281 (2014) (referring to Professor Joseph Sax as the “father of environmental 
law” and explaining that “he is the person most responsible for giving us the modern expres-
sion of the public trust doctrine.”).   
132  See id. at 478. 
133  J. INST. 2.1.1. 
134  NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2017) (“The water of all sources of water supply within the 
boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the 
public.”). 
135  THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., supra note 62, at 654. 
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eas of law that fell within the scope of traditional government authority.136 Giv-
en the relative abundance of water and other natural resources prior to the nine-
teenth century, there were few occasions for dispute; however, just as the doc-
trine of federally reserved water rights was expanded to accommodate new 
circumstances, so too was the public trust.137 The doctrine was extended to pro-
tect resources once considered outside its scope and even incorporated notions 
of ecological integrity into the analysis.138 To understand just how far the doc-
trine has developed, it is important to understand how it began. 
A. History of the Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine gained significant attraction in American law 
when it was applied by the Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois.139 In 1869, the Illinois legislature granted a large tract of submerged land 
to the Illinois Central Railroad.140 That grant included land underneath Lake 
Michigan from the shoreline to one mile out into open water along Chicago’s 
central business district.141 This land grant effectively placed nearly all of Chi-
cago’s commercial waterfront property—over “one thousand acres of incalcu-
lable value”—in private hands, allowing the railroad company to control access 
to the water as well.142 By 1873, the Illinois legislature came to regret its exces-
sive generosity to the Illinois Central Railroad and repealed the 1869 grant.143 It 
also initiated an action to have the original grant declared invalid.144 
The Supreme Court upheld the state’s claim.145 In doing so, the Court 
opined one of the few decisions where a state’s express conveyance of trust 
lands was found to be “beyond the power of a state legislature.”146 The decision 
did not completely prohibit the sale of trust lands to private parties altogeth-
er.147 Instead, the Court held that a government action such as this, which 
grants the entire waterfront of a major city to a private party, constitutes an im-
permissible abdication of legislative authority over navigation.148 This abdica-
tion, the Court explained, amounts to the state divesting itself of authority to 
                                                        
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436 (1892). 
140  Sax, supra note 131, at 489. 
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govern an area over which it has a duty to exercise its police power, and is 
therefore invalid.149 
Even though the state could still have exercised a substantial amount of 
regulatory authority over the private land, the Court found the state has special 
regulatory obligations over this public trust resource—obligations which are 
simply incompatible with large-scale private ownership.150 The Court explained 
that the title under which Illinois holds the waters of Lake Michigan is: 
[D]ifferent in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for  sale 
. . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters,  carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fish-
ing therein freed from the obstruction or interferences of private parties.151 
Illinois Central articulated the guiding principle behind the public trust 
doctrine: when the government holds a resource that is intended for the public’s 
use, courts will apply considerable scrutiny to any action that either restricts the 
public’s use of that resource or subjects the public’s use to the interests of pri-
vate parties.152 Consequently, private property rights are generally inferior to 
the public’s interest over resources within the public trust,153 and now the doc-
trine even prevents private appropriators from diverting water from its natural 
course if the diversion is detrimental to the waterway’s ecology.154 
B. Expansion of the Public Trust Doctrine 
During the twentieth century, the public trust doctrine was expanded to 
cover new circumstances and new waters. By 1983, in National Audubon Soci-
ety v. Superior Court, the doctrine was extended to tributaries (non-navigable 
waterways, like streams and creeks) for the first time in American history.155 
This case marked the first major deviation from decades of jurisprudence that 
limited the doctrine’s application to waters that fell squarely within the gov-
ernment’s control—navigable waters, such as rivers, lakes, and coastal zones, 
used for commerce and fishing.156 As the court in National Audubon Society 
                                                        
149  Id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 489–90 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)). 
152  Id. at 490. 
153  Glass v. Goeckel,703 N.W.2d 58, 66 (2005). 
154  See Hudson Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908) (explaining that “few 
public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of particular theory than the 
interest of the public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially 
undiminished . . . This public interest is omnipresent . . . and grows more pressing as popula-
tion grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private property of riparian pro-
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155  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct. of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983). 
156  Id. at 719 (noting “[e]arly English decisions generally assumed the public trust was lim-
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explained, “[T]he public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm 
caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries.”157 
Following National Audubon Society, California courts may now apply the 
principles of the public trust to navigable waterways, as well as waterways that 
connect to a navigable waterway.158 This ruling placed nearly all of California’s 
waterways within the scope of the public trust (since most of California’s wa-
ters flow to the ocean), allowing most nonnavigable diversions to be scrutinized 
under public trust considerations.159 That is, the only waters that fall outside the 
public trust doctrine are those that have no hydrological connection to any nav-
igable or nonnavigable waterways. 
National Audubon Society had another important impact on American wa-
ter law—it solidified the idea of defining harm in terms of environmental harm, 
building upon previous cases recognizing the protection of ecological values as 
a legitimate exercise of the government’s public trust duty.160 The plaintiffs in 
National Audubon Society successfully demonstrated that diverting the tributar-
ies of Mono Lake was causing the lake’s water level to drop, triggering a dom-
ino effect of detrimental environmental impacts.161 These environmental im-
pacts fell within the scope of the public trust doctrine, allowing the court to 
take corrective action against the private appropriator.162 
In 2005, the public trust doctrine was expanded again to include the pub-
lic’s right to walk along the shoreline of public trust waters. In Glass v. Goeck-
el, the Supreme Court of Michigan, applying Illinois Central, found that private 
ownership of the shores of the Great Lakes cannot diminish the right of the 
public to access and walk along those privately-owned shores.163 In other 
words, the public trust not only encompasses the public’s right to use water, it 
also includes the public’s right to access it. This ruling directly applied the 
principle that private rights are inferior to the public’s right to access the re-
sources held in the public trust. The Glass court explained: 
[W]hen a private party acquires littoral property from the sovereign, it acquires 
only the jus privatum. Our courts have continued to recognize this distinction 
between private title and public rights when they have applied the public trust 
                                                        
157  Id. at 721. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971). (explaining how “[t]here is growing 
public recognition that one of the most important public uses of [public trust waters] . . . is 
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doctrine . . . . Under the public trust doctrine, the sovereign never had the power 
to eliminate those rights, so any subsequent  conveyance of littoral property re-
main subject to those public rights.164 
After explaining the public trust doctrine generally, the court went on to 
determine its scope and whether walking the lakeshore was the type of activity 
the public trust doctrine was meant to encompass.165 The court noted that the 
traditional rights protected under the public trust include activities such as 
“fishing, hunting, and navigation for commerce or pleasure[,]” and therefore 
the public must necessarily have an implied “right of passage” over land to en-
gage in these activities.166 The court explained that it “can protect traditional 
public rights under [the] public trust doctrine only by simultaneously safe-
guarding activities inherent in the exercise of those rights.”167 Since accessing 
the shores is required to undertake those traditionally recognized rights, “[T]he 
public has always held a right of passage in and along the lakes.”168 This con-
clusion closely parallels Emperor Justinian’s logic when he stated, “no one is 
barred access to the seashore.”169 for essentially the same reasons roughly fif-
teen-hundred years ago. 
C. Linking the Doctrine to Fundamental Rights 
The public trust doctrine answers the second constitutional question—is 
the public’s right to access water “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition[?]”170 Applying the powerful public policy considerations of the pub-
lic trust doctrine, which themselves are rooted in ancient Roman law, the an-
swer appears to be in the affirmative. 
The public trust doctrine is not only deeply rooted in our nation’s history 
and traditions, it actually pre-dates the nation itself. From the time Emperor 
Justinian first enacted this policy, the doctrine survived through the common 
law, remaining intact within the legal frameworks upon which our own justice 
system is based. The Glass Court’s explanation that “the sovereign never had 
the power to eliminate those rights”171 is illustrative in this regard. The public’s 
rights encompassed within the public trust doctrine have always existed—not 
requiring any legislative foundation to be recognized—and the government is 
incapable of revoking them. In other words, public trust rights are fundamental 
within our system of government. 
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169  Id. at 64 (citations omitted). 
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The public policy considerations of the doctrine remain as relevant today 
as they were in ancient times. As trustee of the nation’s waters, the government 
has a special obligation to not allow this vital resource to become impaired or 
fall into private hands. Following the doctrine’s modern expansion, it seems the 
majority of the nation’s waters likely fall within the scope of public trust con-
siderations—considerations which now include environmental concerns. Water 
is simply too important to be controlled by private interests or substantially di-
minished. This policy is as applicable now as it was fifteen-hundred years ago, 
as water is no less important to society today than it was in the times of Emper-
or Justinian. 
The fact that the public trust doctrine specifically recognizes access to wa-
ter directly ties into our definition of the proposed fundamental right. The pub-
lic’s “right of passage”172 to access water to engage in public trust activities su-
persedes any private property right which might prevent such access—this right 
should include drinking. The doctrine even provides the basis for revoking pri-
vate water rights when weighed against the public’s rights encompassed by the 
trust.173 As National Audubon Society explained, “[our] cases amply demon-
strate the continuing power of the state as administrator of the public trust, a 
power which extends to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the en-
forcement of the trust against lands long thought [to be] free of the trust.”174 
Thus, the doctrine’s broad authority, flexibility, and policy make it the ideal le-
gal foundation for recognizing the public’s fundamental right to water when 
weighed against private property rights. 
The interdisciplinary approach, once again, sheds light on the second con-
stitutional question. The public’s right to access water is, in fact, deeply rooted 
in the Nation’s history and traditions through the government’s administration 
of the public trust. The doctrine not only answers the constitutional question, it 
provides the basis of the fundamental right itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s need to recognize the public’s fundamental right to 
water grows more pressing with each passing day. Climate change, water pollu-
tion, and increasing populations pose a serious threat to the nation’s (and plan-
et’s) water supply.175 Communities across the globe are facing the dire situation 
of having more cups than water to fill them. Places like Mexico City176 and 
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Cape Town, South Africa, where civilians prepare for “Day Zero”177 (the day 
the city runs out of water) provide a glimpse into our inevitable future if the 
Court refuses to establish water as a fundamental right. In these cities, police 
officers guard water trucks as they wind their way through neighborhoods to 
deliver the critical resource to people struggling to survive. Children, mothers, 
and fathers all wait for a vital, life-sustaining resource that so many of us take 
for granted every single day—creating a scene that looks more like the set of a 
dystopian science-fiction movie than a modern metropolis.178 
In sum, the well is drying up. Unless we are prepared to face the horrific 
conditions created when there is not enough water to go around, the judiciary 
must recognize the right to water as a fundamental human right. Enacting a pol-
icy like California’s Human Right to Water Bill on the federal level is essential 
to ensure that national water resources do not become diminished or impaired, 
thereby threatening the livelihood of the country. Such a tragedy would render 
established fundamental rights moot—we cannot travel, marry, or vote if we’re 
unable to sustain daily life. Water is the foundation of our civilization, and ac-
cess to clean, safe water is a national problem that requires a national solution. 
To be effective, the right need not create an affirmative duty on the gov-
ernment. Adopting a national policy that guarantees each individual the mini-
mum amount of water needed to maintain their daily lives simply places a duty 
on the government to account for every community’s water needs—needs that 
must be considered when allocating water resources or resolving water dis-
putes. 
To a large extent, the right would act as an administrative mechanism with-
in the existing water law framework, allowing it to address both water quantity 
and water quality concerns. Requiring a minimum amount of water to remain in 
places where people currently reside provides a safeguard to rural communities 
threatened by urban water projects, while simultaneously forcing cities to curb 
development unless there is enough water to satisfy the forecasted expansion. 
Private parties may not simply purchase all the private water rights from a giv-
en source, as the public’s right to access that water would then supersede the 
private interest. This an even-handed solution that does not tip the scales too far 
in favor of urban or rural communities. Rather, it provides an equitable solution 
for people all across the nation—and, most importantly, places the public good 
above any private right. 
Additionally, by defining the right in terms of “safe” or “clean” water, the 
policy places greater importance on water quality standards, forcing local gov-
ernments to maintain their water infrastructure and water treatment facilities 
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and avoid scenarios like the Flint Water Crisis.179 It would also force the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to re-evaluate national drinking water standards 
periodically to keep pace with the growing number of chemical pollutants be-
ing developed in various industries. 
The interdisciplinary approach discussed in this article streamlines the con-
stitutional fundamental rights analysis. There is simply no need to limit the in-
quiry solely to fundamental rights cases if other areas of law have already ad-
dressed the very same considerations and shed light on the issues for which we 
are trying to find solutions. Water law exemplifies this concept. There is no 
need to reinvent the wheel when it comes to these types of analyses—the 
groundwork has already been laid by the credible, reliable, scholarly sources 
presented in this article. The various doctrines that comprise American water 
law provide insightful answers to the constitutional analysis and should be the 
first place that legal practitioners turn to when determining if water is worthy of 
becoming America’s next fundamental right. 
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